UNRWA as a “Phantom Sovereign”

Governance Practices in Lebanon

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"Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country."

Lenin speech at the Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, Moscow, 4 December 1920

Parallel to Lenin’s quote, and projecting the former Soviet Union to a refugee camp, I would say that a good governance system in a camp should also be composed by a power and service provision: ideally power will stem from the community (such as political factions for the
political issues and popular committees for administrative and municipal issues) with services provided by humanitarian organizations and host authorities because they are a refugee population. However, given that popular committees are often dysfunctional and host authorities ignore this population, UNRWA cannot afford to become a mere service provider. During the past two decades, governing a nation or a city or a camp has been shown to require decentralization of the governance system and involvement of many actors. As Michel Foucault (1990) reminds us, what is important is not the formal power that stems from the exercise of sovereignty but rather the effects of power that a governmental technology generates. While UNRWA generally presents itself as a mere provider of services, it is de facto much more than that. This constitutes the major hypothesis I formulate for this chapter.

The chapter investigates the role that UNRWA plays in camp governance, specifically in the administrative and municipal realm, not in the political domain. Because of its mandate, a humanitarian organization like UNRWA has historically understood its role as a temporary relief provider to a temporary group of victims, carefully avoiding taking on a wider governing role. At the same time, most refugees have effectively assigned UNRWA a key role, holding it responsible for problems in the camps that go well beyond the realm of its mandate. This generates frequent misunderstandings that characterize the current status quo (Misselwitz and Hanafi 2010). I shall begin by analyzing the complex reality of camp governance, which forms the point of departure for our analysis: who governs the camps? And why does UNRWA constitute a “phantom sovereignty”? 
Camp Governance: UNRWA as a “Phantom Sovereign”

Quite similar to other humanitarian organizations, as we will point out in the next section, UNRWA traditionally considered refugees to be needy victims. Analogous to the failure of acknowledging the urbanization process that transformed tent cities into complex built environments is the failure of acknowledging that traumatized and voiceless victims desire to become emancipated subjects, especially after some sort of normalcy of life in the camps has set in. The paternalistic approach – a relief agency serving an anonymous crowd of beneficiaries – enters into crisis, unable to cope with the ever more complex landscape of emerging community initiatives, local institutions and social mobilization.

Many actors are playing a role in the governance of Palestinian refugee camps. In Syria and Jordan, the State controls the camps closely and through their specific organs (the General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR) in Syria and the Department of Palestinian Affairs (DAP) in Jordan) which assigns camp directors who plays a major role in organizing the urban and political life inside the camps. In contrast to this classical state control over slum areas including camps, the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) and Lebanon is radically different. In these locations there is a web of complex power structures composed of one or two conflicting popular committees (in Lebanon), a security committee, notables (wujaha), political factions, Palestine Scholars’ League (imams coalition close to Hamas), Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)’s popular unions and organizations (workers, women, engineers, etc.), community based organizations (CBOs), NGOs and UNRWA Camp Services Officers (CSOs). These forces vary in their importance from camp to camp and from area to area. In each camp,
leaders have imposed measures, which are frequently changing as a consequence of a constantly shifting balance of power between these different groups. The popular committees, however, stand out as the most important local governing body in Lebanon and the oPt. It is worth noting that the label “popular” could be misleading because it is not based on a popular vote but it projects the strength of one group or party vis-à-vis others (in Gaza and the West Bank, the term “local committee” or “camp committee” is also frequently used (Hanafi 2010).²

Instead of one sovereign, camps in Lebanon and the oPt are ruled by a tapestry of multiple, partial sovereignties. This includes real sovereign bodies like the Lebanese government or the PLO/Palestinian National Authority (PNA)/State of Palestine and a patchwork of actors who contribute to the governance of the camp. The situation is made even more complex when UNRWA’s role is taken into account. Here, I would like to introduce the notion of “phantom sovereignty” in order to describe and analyze the critical position of the Agency.

As suggested in the introduction, we don’t understand the notion of power in a formal way but through the effects of power that different governmentalities generate. While UNRWA was not intended to, nor does it pretend to, govern the camps, it is ascribed the status of a sovereign by many camp dwellers. This is perhaps best exemplified by the ambiguous role of UNRWA’s CSOs, camp-based staff members who historically assume a powerful position vis-à-vis the camp community. Their authority included in the past, for example, the ability to cut rations in respect of an individual who did not obey UNRWA regulations (Feldman 2008). UNRWA
historically appointed these officers from among the camp community, after consultation with
and verbal approval from local tribal and village leaders.

This policy is doubly accommodating. By appointing a representative of the camp’s elite to
become an official staff member, UNRWA sought legitimation and acceptance. From the early
1990s, UNRWA increasingly appointed as CSOs members of new camp elites, such as well-
educated camp residents (engineers, teachers, and pharmacists) who were sometimes known
historically for their political activism and good relations with the community. In interviews,
camp dwellers often refer to the CSO as “camp director”, yet in reality his official function is
merely to act as a facilitator of access to UNRWA services. Interviews clearly showed the gap
between this perceived role and the staff member’s actual function. This confusion stems from
the historical role played by UNRWA CSOs in not only providing services, but also in
administering and coordinating many aspects of the refugees’ lives. As a result, the “camp
directors” are perceived as occupying a ruling position without acting accordingly.

The confusion over the role of CSOs is symptomatic of the confusion over the role of UNRWA
in general (see Brynen in this volume). Many camp residents, for instance, consider UNRWA
and the popular committees responsible for the disorder in the camps. Expressing her anger at
their perceived passivity, a resident posed the question: “Who can I complain to when my
neighbor builds a second and third floor without leaving any proper space for my apartment?”
Many interviewees indeed used words like “chaos”, “security”, “unruliness,” “lawlessness”
(felatan amni), and “clanism” (al-asha’riya) to describe the situation in the camps and attribute UNRWA’s inaction as one of the major causes of it. This is why many interviewees’ testimonials showed that the relationship between them and UNRWA is characterized by frustration, mistrust, miscommunication and mutual misunderstandings. But this resentment toward UNRWA is not a rejection of aid, rather a rejection of aid as a substitute for political action, especially in terms of camp governance (Parry 2002). To explain this ambivalence of UNRWA’s position vis-a-vis camp governance, we argue that UNRWA officers are in constant negotiation between the Agency’s mandate and its transgression.

**Mandate Vs. Practices**

The bio-power (Foucault 1990) exercised by humanitarian organizations has created categories for those in need with the effect of depoliticizing them. Refugees are transformed into bodies to be fed and sheltered while being deprived of their political existence. Humanitarian law is used to refer to “protected people” (Feller et al. 2003: page) but current humanitarian practices focus mainly on “victims” or, at times, “survivors” in order to sound more positive. By classifying people as victims, the basis of humanitarian action is shifted from rights to welfare. In disaster areas—the space of exception—values of generosity and pragmatism obscure any references to the rights and responsibilities of the people concerned (refugees, humanitarian organizations, international community, etc.) that would endow them with their own agency.

However, throughout the years, the activities of refugee organizations (the list is long: the Nansen Bureau for Russian and Armenian Refugees in 1921; the High Commission for Refugees
from Germany in 1936; the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees in 1938; the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations in 1946; UNRWA from 1950 onwards; and since 1951 up to the present, the UN High Commission for Refugees) have been limited according to their mandates to “humanitarian and social” issues while excluding political issues (Agamben 1997: page). With refugees often stripped of their political existence and identities and reduced to their status as individuals in need of shelter and food, as bare life, the entire refugee question has been transferred to the hands of the police and military forces, on the one hand, and to apolitical service organizations such as UNRWA, on the other. However, while the agency of off-camp dwellers allowed them to transgress these different layers of powers, the situation of refugees residing in camps is much more complex and deserves more consideration.

When reconsidering the emergence of the urban identity of the camp, it becomes clear that the identity and political status of camp dwellers is related to the very nature of the camp and to its segregation and isolation as a distinct and enclosed spatial unit. Refugees who are not camp dwellers tend to quickly establish good relationships with their host society and to escape the status of “victims.” In the area where the camp is a ‘closed’ space, mainly in Lebanon (Hanafi 2008), the camp forms the conditions that facilitate the use of bio-politics by the host countries and to a lesser extent by UNRWA, because refugees are gathered in a centralized and controlled place where they can be under constant surveillance. This is also applicable in the oPt, but not to the same extent. This “care, cure, and control” system has transformed refugee camps into disciplinary spaces (Zureik 2003, Peteet 2005). In the pretext of facilitating the provision of services, the camp is conceived as the only workable possible form of space, as outside camps the distribution of food and other services to the refugees would become almost impossible. In
the Palestinian context, however, the problem does not lie only with the spatial nature of the camp, but also with the mandate of UNRWA, the main provider of services in the camp.

UNRWA was created in December 1949 by virtue of resolution 302 of the UN GA (it started its operations in May 1950) as a refugee organization specifically dedicated to the Palestinian refugees. Its UN mandate included catering for the basic needs of refugees while promoting integration in the host country, but excluded de jure protection of refugees or advocating for their return to their homes (Khoury 2010, Bocco 2010). Despite its very strict mandate, in the past fifteen years, there have been cases in which the organization has acted beyond the letter of the mandate. For example, when it provided “passive protection” for Palestinian refugees during the first intifada (1987-1994). Since a multi-stakeholder conference in Geneva in 2004, the agency has started linking service provision to advocacy, and recently, a rights-based approach to its humanitarian mandate has been emerging. One can notice relatively strong language used in UNRWA publications to attract the attention of the international community to the continuous plight of Palestinian refugees. However, taking into account housing, children’s and women’s rights, and other rights for that matter does not mean that the right of return has become part of UNRWA’s advocacy strategy. In spite of the importance of UNRWA publications for mobilizing the international community, the very concept of refugees as an artifact of victimization discourse obstructs the possibility of resistance that seeks to advance their return and statehood. The United States and some of UNRWA’s European donors consider that if UNRWA goes in the direction of looking for a durable solution such as settlement and return, it will undergo dangerous politicization, although UNHCR’s case has shown that being involved in the search for durable solutions does not have to conflict with an essentially humanitarian mandate (Takkenberg 2006). I was very interested in demystifying the de-politicization of
humanitarianism ever since the beginning of the Second Intifada. In 2003 in Jerusalem I co-organized with Adi Ophir a two-day workshop on “The Politics of Humanitarianism in the Occupied Territories” for international, Palestinian and Israeli human rights and humanitarian organizations. Scholars and practitioners presented their different visions, generating much discussion and even some tension. So absorbing was the debate that Peter Hansen, the Commissioner General of UNRWA at the time, who came to present a paper, stayed for the whole workshop. Pursuant this discussion, Hansen argued with this nonpolitical stance, UNRWA has done some politics in its own way. According to him, many UNRWA activities were transgressing the relief to the Palestinian refugees toward the politics, for example, the passive protection of the refugees.

As the new UNRWA discourse began to appear, Karen Koning AbuZayd, then Commissioner-General, subtly revealed the tension between what is political and what is humanitarian in her statement at the Host and Donors Meeting held in Amman on December 11, 2006:

This tension is manifested in a variety of ways. One of its most striking manifestations is the contrast between the readiness of states to fund emergency responses, compared to their failure to address the questions of international law and politics that cause these emergencies. That tension is clear in the way in which the urgency to resolve underlying questions of justice and peace for Palestinians is somehow divorced from the challenge of providing for their human needs.  

UNRWA has played a valuable role in empowering Palestinian refugees by providing primary and vocational/technical education, health services, relief and social services, sometimes job
creation and other emergency support, and microfinance (since 1991), and more recently in being engaged in public advocacy for the protection of the refugees. In spite of all these benign efforts, they have not been sufficient to get the majority of the Palestinian refugees beyond the threshold of poverty and isolation and to allow their social and economic integration into Lebanese society and that of the oPt. While this cannot be attributed to UNRWA alone, I do believe that due to its mandate, UNRWA has been unable to always seize the opportunity and promote some changes in the situation of the Palestinian refugees. The involvement of UNRWA in the reconstruction of the Jenin refugee camp after its partial destruction by the IDF in 2002 is revealing in this sense. Instead of alleviating the crowdedness of the camps by advocating for the return of some refugees to their place of origin (a third of Jenin’s refugees come from the village of Zaraan, located some 17 kilometers west of the city), UNRWA pursued only two options: rebuilding the camp while respecting its boundaries and asking the Jenin municipality to allocate a piece of land to allow its expansion. Also only recently did UNRWA become vocal on criticizing some Arab host countries’ policies toward the Palestinian refugees. Because UNRWA’s mandate has never included the repatriation or resettlement of refugees, the agency’s ‘care and maintenance’ activities have been widely interpreted by many interviewees as a failed attempt to appease a population with humanitarian action in lieu of durable political solutions (see also Parry 2002: 6; cited by Abu Zahra 2005). In addition to the temporary UNRWA mandate precluding long term planning, and having always been financially vulnerable, UNRWA operates with different pressures on the Agency and is dependent on host country cooperation.

In all its fields, and in spite of the relative dissatisfaction with UNRWA’s services (Al Husseini and Bocco 2010; see also the Palestinian Association for Human Rights - Shahed’s public
opinion polls), UNRWA’s role is crucial to the social and economic support and relief activities, through its programs running in the camp, and through its bodies such as the Camp Service Offices and the Women Program Centers (WPCs). The Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme has the potential to chance to readdress the relationship between UNRWA and camp communities.

**UNRWA camp governance: Promising Signs**

As seen so far, ambivalence and negotiation has been characterizing the mandate of UNRWA, which has gone in the last five years into the right direction but not without some setbacks. In this section, I will highlight some promising signs that have appeared in Lebanon.

**Reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared**

Little emphasis was given to transparent communication, consideration of local feedback beyond technocratic surveys, or the constraints under which the Agency operates (including funding shortages). Due to the lack of direct communication based on partnership, bias and prejudice against UNRWA became widespread in the camps. This included accusations ranging from corruption and incompetence to political conspiracy. Although, mistrust is a general problem facing UNRWA, camp improvement was likely to fail entirely if the relationship between the Agency and the community could not be improved. The story of the reconstruction of the Nahr el-Bared camp is highly instructive as it reveals not only of the relationship of UNRWA with the Palestinian community but also its role in defending the right of this community vis-à-vis the Lebanese authorities.
The yet to be completed reconstruction efforts have been broadly influenced by UNRWA’s new camp improvement approach. For the first time, UNRWA accepted working in full partnership with a grassroots, yet technocratic, organization, Nahr el-Bared Reconstruction Commission for Civil Action and Studies (NBRC). The significance of this group - of which I served as a member for few months in 2008 - is that its members understand the importance of empowering populations by organizing them. Composed of engineers and professionals, most of whom live in the camp, this organization has taken on the main responsibility of managing community participation and in partnership with UNRWA preparing a geographical information system (GIS) plan on the spatial situation of the camp before its destruction and the desired future plan (Hanafi and Sheikh Hassan 2009).

The process of community participation has never been easy. There have always been many difficulties brought about by the attitude of both the Lebanese government, which in the beginning wanted to deal only with international organizations like UNRWA, and PLO officials, who did not credit the role of civil society in community participation. UNRWA played a chief role in empowering community participation though the full participation of NBRC in the entire design process.

Initially, the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) refused any Palestinian interlocutor under the pretext that if it would call on the PLO, Hamas would be upset and vice
versa. We asked LPDC to accept NBRC as an initiative of civil society but they refused. In my capacity as NBRC member, I called the head of UNRWA, Richard Cook, to report that we would not cooperate with UNRWA, unless NBRC is present. Cook called LPDC, but they continued to refuse our incorporation. They said that they would accept me alone as an individual but not as representative of NBRC. I refused to go under this label. UNRWA threatened to withdraw from the process. Finally, I was invited as a representative of NBRC and after the first meeting a more technical delegation from NBRC continued to meet with the Lebanese authority in charge of the reconstruction. After overcoming this hurdle, protracted negotiations began between the various Lebanese actors, UNRWA and NBRC. Security related issues raised by the military dictated all spatial and design considerations. Nonetheless, thanks to the UNRWA-NBRC partnership, the planning process did incorporate some of the interests of the Palestinians. UNRWA started to accept the right to refugee participation in the shaping of the urban environment, and other parts of its programs for that matter, as part of its approach to protection. It increasingly realized that participation constituted part of the civil rights of the refugees.

During Salvatore Lombardo tenure as Director of UNRWA Affairs, Lebanon (2008-2011), he spent a lot his time negotiating with the Lebanese government about the reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared but also, and this was very new in UNRWA’s history, in respect of Palestinian’s right to work and to own property. He successfully negotiated with some Lebanese municipalities to be involved in the improvement of the camp’s infrastructure. Paradoxically and by populism, Hamas waged an unjustifiable campaign against him in spite his outstanding innovation in empowering Palestinian refugees through advocating for their basic rights in front of the
Lebanese authorities. A number of interviews we recently conducted with Palestinian leaders revealed that this policy is not pursued in the same way by his successor, Ann Dismorr. One of them stated: “the new UNRWA director is very low profile. She does not want to advocate our rights to the Lebanese authorities. She thinks that politics in Lebanon is like in Scandinavian countries. She does not realize that if UNRWA does not pay tip the Lebanese officers in the department of Antiquities, they would never authorize the pursuing of the construction of new blocks in Nahr el-Bared. In the same time, she does not want to denounce them publicly. The result is a delay of more than one month to get the paper from this department.” This quote demonstrates that UNRWA needs to develop a policy for the agency to be structurally more involved in defending refugee rights to host authorities and not to leave it at the initiative and discretion of individual UNRWA bureaucrats.

**Mediation structure**

UNRWA has played an important role as mediator between popular committees, on the one hand, and the central government and the municipal authorities in the host country, on the other. During the last two years, UNRWA, in cooperation with UNDP, engaged in training programs for the popular committees of Baddawi and Nahr el-Bared camps.

To increase the contact with the community on the ground, UNRWA has developed new job descriptions for its Chief Area Officers (CAOs), requiring broader qualifications while delegating to them with more power on the ground, including inside the camps. Recently each CAO has been provided with an Operation Assistant to support them in their work.
Meeting with the Chief Area Officers, I realized that their time allocation is as follows: 30% of their time is occupied by dealing with individual cases, 40 to 50% is meeting with popular committees, negotiating with the Army for entering reconstruction material, negotiating with the local municipality, with the relevant electricity company and with the phone company. Only a relatively small amount of time is set aside for internal UNRWA business (recruitment, development, etc.). A further interview confirmed this impression. ACAO declared: “More than three quarters of their time is spent on governance matters: negotiating with various Palestinian factions, popular committee and Lebanese authorities’ concerning problems related to service delivery.”

According to various CAOs, the major problem they face is the personal protection of their employees. Many employees are subject to threats, humiliation and even physical attacks. They complain of the lack of Palestinian central authority (marji‘iyya siyasiya lli-tanzimat):

“Historically we used to talk with the head of Fatah or PFPL to resolve an emerging problem inside camps… Now there is no central power … factions’ representatives are often in conflict with the Popular Committee members even if appointed by them”.

Finally, UNRWA is not only mediating between popular committee and host authorities but also between Palestinian and Lebanese NGOs. In March 2009, for the first time UNRWA established an NGO forum whose objective is to coordinate the activities of Palestinian and Lebanese NGOs
working in the refugee camps. Sub-sectoral forums were also created: one for the education sector and another for the health sector.

**Conclusion: Lessons from UNHCR**

In this chapter I have argued that the resulting “phantom sovereignty” of UNRWA is based on this fundamental misunderstanding of roles and responsibilities, which leaves a problematic void, contributes to the sense of permanent emergency and exception, and fuels mistrust and suspicion. However recently we have witnessed a tremendous change in the manner that UNRWA interprets its mandate concerning its involvement in camp governance.

It took UNHCR a long time, till the early 1990s, to be convinced that governing a camp required a governance system with local participation. Prior to that, UNHCR played a very ambiguous role in terms of promoting or diminishing the influence of the notables in the camps. However since the 1990s, UNHCR became more systematic, promoting community participation and organizing elections.

Emphasis on participation can be seen in Tanzania. Looking at UNHCR’s influence on the physical organization of camps in Tanzania, it is apparent that UNHCR is downplaying traditional authorities within camps. After the distasteful experience of locating Rwandan genocide participants in Benaco, and the disastrous situation of refugee camps being used by
various rebel groups as bases for operations in Rwanda, UNHCR attempts to mitigate the influence of former political parties and notables in these camps were striking. In Simon Turner’s description of Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania and Shelley Dick’s description of Congolese camps, both explained UNHCR’s implementation of a system by which UNHCR created an entirely new leadership in the refugee communities. In these camps, UNHCR insisted on setting up tents in controlled arbitrary grids, and assigning refugees to plots based on order of arrival as opposed to home community. In Burundi and the Congo, UNHCR also implemented this method of organization, basing community elections on this layout. Because each voting block was made up of people from many different villages, it was unlikely that former notables would be elected. Instead, camp committee representatives were often younger men, who were both competent and represented a change in the authority structure (Turner 2006: 321, Dick 2002: 9-12, cited by Tonge, 2009).

This model was a crucial improvement on the previous models of exclusion and segmentation. However, I would qualify the UNHCR approach as a top-down model where the role of participation and election is set from above. UNRWA may adopt UNHCR’s emphasis on governance within the camp, rather than avoiding the issue. UNRWA should not be merely a phantom sovereign. With more transparent governance system, the relationship between UNRWA and community could be fostered with a genuine partnership. In Lebanon, UNRWA help to the popular committees is crucial. Why?
First, PLO factions and Coalition factions are so weak that they cannot negotiate alone with the Lebanese government,\textsuperscript{11} as well as military and municipal authorities on issues pertaining to the Palestinian rights, camp improvement, etc. Second, there are more positive signs about some of the first steps towards redefining the roles of provider and passive recipient into a more genuine partnership between UNRWA and the community, such as the efforts towards reconstruction in urban planning that have been strongly approved by UNRWA’s new camp improvement department. This department advocated for a different approach and convinced UNRWA into taking on a full partnership with the NBRC.

Ultimately, the situation can be improved by developing effective, democratically endorsed camp governance structures that represent community interests and can lead to camp improvements. UNRWA may choose to accept and engage with existing representative structures, overcome its paternalistic approach and sometimes institutional arrogance, and carefully assist and strengthen camp governance.

I conclude by offering two recommendations. Firstly, the best way to be involved in camp governance is to foster community participation in prioritization in respect of service provision. As UNRWA has scarce resource, it should consider adopting the model of Porto Alegre’s municipality and discuss its proposed budget allocation with a forum in each camp. (Hanafi 2010) These forums should not be composed by the popular committees but comprise a more representative audience, for example by inviting political factions and possibly NGOs and
grassroots organizations to nominate educated youth and other representatives. Secondly, it is crucial that UNRWA empower CAOs and CSOs by giving them more power and ask them to be more on the ground listening to the refugee problem.

Bibliography


1 Lenin's famous plan of electrification of Russia (GOELRO Plan) was born in 1920, under conditions of utter ruin and starvation.

2 For more details see Hanafi 2010.

3 However, fearing the Israeli reaction in the oPt, UNRWA avoided appointing people with express political affiliations.

4 One should note that UNRWA went much further during the first Intifada. It did not only advocacy but also physical protection in the field (1988’s creation of the Refugee Affairs Officer program and 1991’s Human Rights Observation program). These programs were discontinued in 1994. Besides, UNRWA contributed materially to the installation of the PNA in the early days of the autonomy (see UNRWA annual reports 94-96) and developed the camps’ infrastructure in line with the UNGA resolution 48/40 of December 93. Furthermore, through the Peace Implementation Program which was launched in 1993 UNRWA attempted to ensure the safety and protection of Palestinians under occupation on one hand, and to make the results of the peace process felt by the Palestinian refugee community on the other.

5 UNRWA organizes Host and Donor meetings once or twice every year where ‘casual issues’ related to UNRWA’ budget and programs and projects are discussed. The 2004 Conference was of a different kind. Its aim was precisely to reach out to non-traditional donors (rich Arab countries, Asian countries, etc.) and to spur further partnership between the host countries and UNRWA. Several seminars involving non-UNRWA experts were held. However, no refugee organization or committee was invited.

6 As a sign of this positive change in the discourse of the UNRWA, see, for example, the presentations of Lex Takkenberg and Anders Fange at the International Conference organized by Al-Quds University in Jerusalem, The Palestinian Refugees: Conditions and Recent Developments, on November 25 and 26, 2006. See also <<www.unrwa.org.>>

7 In this line see the highly ill-founded criticisms of James Lindsay (2009)

8 Her speech for the Host and Donors Meeting held in Amman on December 11, 2006.
9 UNRWA created a Committee for Employment of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon.

10 In some cases, UNHCR actively supports the notables’ influence in the camps. In Kakuma, UNHCR cooperates with the SPLA as a legitimate source of authority, to the point where Verdirame and Harrell-Bond state that SPLA officials “were treated as the sole legitimate voice of the Dinka ‘community’” (2005: 261). However, in many other situations, UNHCR actively downplays notables’ authority, and creates other sources of authority. In the Congolese refugee camps mentioned above, the traditional justice system of punishments and trial is in conflict with the judiciary system that UNHCR supports. UNHCR attempts to implement the Tanzanian judiciary system, where the sentence for rape is 30 years in prison. Both UNHCR and the Tanzanian government have attempted to encourage refugees to report the rapes to their authorities as opposed to the community elders, with varying degrees of success. (Dick 2002: 22; cited by Tonge 2009).

11 UNRWA played an active role in work campaign and establishing the CEP. See the Bianchi in this volume.

12 UNHCR adopted a similar model during the past decade, with mixed results. It was prescribing mandatory consultation with refugee representatives before deciding on budget cuts and or other budgetary decisions at country level.